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In this paper it is analyzed the regulation of access to and activity of certain professions, 
namely lawyers and physicians. A quick review of the economic theory of regulation of 
professions, namely (a) Why regulate, (b) How to regulate, and (c) What to regulate is 
presented. We suggest a set of indicators to measure the quality of regulatory restrictions 
(hence exposing comparative inefficiencies) in professional activities. We conclude that 
generally speaking the US followed by Norway, the UK [England and Wales] and Belgium 
perform better in terms of efficient regulation, whereas Germany, Austria and Portugal perform 
badly for both legal and medical professionals. Other countries (including the Netherlands, 
Spain, France) vary. Our results are somehow consistent with previous reports. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A profession can be defined as an occupation with the following characteristics: specialized 
skills, that skill is partially or fully acquired by intellectual training, the service calls for a high 
degree of integrity, and it involves direct or fiduciary relations with clients (Ogus, 1994, page 
216). 
 
In this paper it is analyzed the regulation of access to and activity of certain professions, 
namely lawyers and physicians. The legal and medical professions (also notaries, pharmacists, 
and accountancy, less so architects and engineers, and even less economists and journalists) 
appear to be relatively highly regulated according to the European Commission. However, 
there are important disparities in levels of regulation across European countries. Austria, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal appear to be quite rigid whereas France, 
Spain, and Belgium have a relatively less strict approach to regulation of a significant number 
of professions. By contrast, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom have developed a more flexible regulatory framework for the professions 
(Stocktaking Exercise on Regulation of Professional Services, Overview of Regulation in the 
EU Member States, 2003). The United States could be included in this last group of countries if 
the analysis were to be extended to outside of the European Union, though there are important 
differences at state level.  
 
Even though many economists think that professional regulatory activities are mostly explained 
by rent-seeking motivation, we find very different institutional arrangements across countries. 
Whilst ultimately governed by law and oversighted by some public official (judge, bureaucrat or 
legislator), these regulations are somehow delimited and enforced by the profession itself. 
Thus, it is of importance to assess which arrangements are more prone to private capture and 
suggest ways of reforming regulatory institutions.  
 
One obvious motivation is the fact that professional regulatory activities have been included in 
the current public policy agenda. The European Commission, in particular the Directorate-
General for Competition, has shown interest in promoting competition in the market for 
professional services, thus opening a general discussion concerning regulatory frameworks 
(Stocktaking Exercise on Regulation of Professional Services, Overview of Regulation in the 
EU Member States, 2003). The British Government has started a review process of the 
regulatory setup of legal services in order to foster competition, innovation, as well as 
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Framework for Legal Services in England and Wales, Consultation Paper by Sir David 
Clementi, 2004).  
 
The present paper has two major parts. In the first part, we present a quick review of the 
economic theory of regulation of professions, namely (a) Why regulate, (b) How to regulate, 
and (c) What to regulate. In the second part, an application to the regulation of professions in 
the United States and Europe is developed. We suggest a set of indicators to measure the 
quality of regulatory restrictions (hence exposing comparative inefficiencies) in legal and 
medical activities. The choice of countries to be included in the analysis has been determined 
by available information. 
 
2. THEORIES OF REGULATION OF PROFESSIONS -- WHY 
We can categorize the different theories in three groups:  
 
2.1. Market Failure (Asymmetry of Information) 
2.2. Public Interest (Apart from Market Failure) 
2.3. Private Interest (Rent-Seeking) 
 
2.1 MARKET FAILURE 
The view that regulation pursues public interest in correcting for market failure (Posner, 1975; 
Noll, 1989) relies on the inefficiency of the market equilibrium. The main market failure that 
applies to professional markets is information asymmetry (Stephen and Love, 1999). For most 
clients and consumers, professional services are credence goods (Darby and Karni, 1973). The 
consumer is less informed about the nature and quality of the service, and often relies on the 
expertise of the professional in order to assess (agency function) and implement the adequate 
strategy (service function). There is a potentially severe problem encompassing some kind of 
supplier-induced demand. Under these conditions the market usually fails to produce the 
socially optimal quantity and quality of the professional service.  Some protection for the 
consumer of professional services is necessary to guarantee quality and mitigate inefficiencies. 
Protection of consumers frequently takes the form of regulation of the profession and its 
markets.  
 
Nevertheless we should have in mind that the costs generated by asymmetry of information 
must be balanced against the benefits of labor specialization. A reduction in information 
asymmetry might not be efficient if it also implies a substantial loss of benefits from labor 
specialization. For example, it is important to emphasize that the information asymmetry does 
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to acquire experience and knowledge of the market which reduces the asymmetry of 
information (e.g., corporate clients in the market for legal services). Professionals must also 
take note of reputational effects which may arise from social networks even when most 
consumers are not repeat purchasers. Furthermore, when the service function is provided 
separately from the agency function, there is scope for revelation of information that limits 
opportunism (e.g., medical diagnosis and treatment by different medical doctors) (Emons, 
1997).  
 
Besides the moral hazard problem we have so far described, there is of course adverse 
selection since consumers cannot judge the quality of professionals. The "lemons problem" 
may arise, thus the need for some kind of licensing or an equivalent mechanism (Leland, 
1979). Competition among professionals does not solve the problem due to the fact that good 
professionals may be driven out of the market by bad professionals given the inability of the 
market to pay for quality. 
 
Another information problem may occur in the market for professional services, namely 
bounded rationality or rational ignorance. Consumers use simplified rules to process 
information rather than complex rational analysis. They also usually lack the education level, or 
even the intellectual ability, to be able to understand all available information on services in a 
correct way. Regulation is justified if the regulatory body has more information and expertise at 
its disposal than average consumers (Maks and Philipsen, 2002). 
 
Legal professionals usually stress the need for self-regulation, arguing that severe losses would 
occur if poorly trained lawyers were allowed to perform services. This loss is particularly 
significant in the health sector, where injuries to the body and life represent substantial and 
eventually under-compensated damages. The consequences of medical maltreatment and 
legal misrepresentation go beyond the direct customer and generate serious negative 
externalities for the general public. Good health standards and the quality of the legal system 
are positively related to the quality of physicians and lawyers (Rubin and Bailey, 1994; Grajzl 
and Murrell, 2004). 
 
Finally a fifth form of market failure that justifies regulation is the existence of public goods. 
Information concerning the quality of professional services satisfies the conditions of non-rivalry 
and non-exclusivity in consumption. Therefore, there is the possibility that private provision (by 
professionals) of information is not efficient. This may well justify mandatory information 
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Regulation of the professional services can improve the market equilibrium. Asymmetric 
information causes moral hazard and adverse selection and eventually negative externalities 
for the general public thus precluding an efficient level of health and legal safety from being 
achieved by the market. The benefits of regulation include a decrease of search costs, 
improvements in service quality and more adequate supply of information concerning quality of 
professional services. Also, and very important, a reduction in risk is to be expected. In fact, 
due to the asymmetry of information, regulation could be the most adequate substitute for 
insurance (Zerbe and Urban, 1988). 
 
Notice that the case for regulation in a public interest perspective is not controversial among 
economists, however it remains unclear which form of regulation should take place. If severe 
limitations to entry, prohibitions of advertising and regulation of fees are justified under a theory 
of public interest, it is still much of an open question. What seems clear is that in a market for 
professional services, where quality is uncertain, confidence and trust in the professionals is 
important for efficiency. After a couple of visits to a doctor a patient whose health problems 
have been solved may start trusting the doctor. An attorney who handles cases with care and 
arranges affairs with success may create a trust relationship with his clients. The problem is of 
course that most customers are not repeat purchasers, and even if they were, the costs of 
mistakes in the initial rounds could be very high. 
 
Regulation and legal rules should aim at enhancing the trust relationship by economizing on 
information costs.  There are three reasons why regulation should create a confidence premium 
(thus rewarding professionals above marginal productivity): (a) The cost of obtaining 
information is lower for the professional than for the client, (b) The information involved is 
productive, (c) The provision of true information must be rewarded in order to avoid strategic 
behavior or opportunism. At a first observation, these reasons explain the need for minimum 
quality standards and even some regulation of fees, but severe restrictions on entry and on 
advertising do not seem justified (Van den Bergh, 1993).    
 
2.2 OTHER GOALS OF PUBLIC NATURE 
Regulation of professionals may also pursue other goals of public nature that are not 
necessarily economic efficiency (i.e., correcting for information asymmetries and externalities). 
These goals may be explained by some kind of patronizing view of the government or 
community values, and usually are related to redistribution (Ogus, 1994, pages 218-219).  
 
Confidence, honesty and trust might be values pursued by the government which in turn may 
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these values may be above its market or economic value, thus justifying government's 
intervention. A doctor or a lawyer in a small town may have a socially valuable role or function 
that goes beyond the professional service s/he provides. Redistribution in favor of the 
professional against the consumer is just a form of paying for these social services. 
 
The problem with this explanation is that it can hardly apply to all professionals. If a doctor or a 
lawyer enjoys local monopoly power in a small town, then we expect s/he to earn extra profits 
(marginal revenue above marginal cost) that could be in some ways justified by these other 
social services s/he provides. However, why a lawyer in a big city where s/he surely does not 
provide such social services should enjoy the some extra profits (due to regulation of fees) is 
hardly justified under a theory of public interest. Furthermore, why consumers of professional 
services should abstain from revealing their willingness to pay for those social services in a 
competitive market seems odd and could in fact conflict with an adequate welfare analysis 
(Kaplow and Shavell, 2002).   
 
2.3 PRIVATE INTEREST 
The last theory of regulation relates to private interest and relies on capture and collusion 
(Posner, 1974). From this perspective the regulation of markets for professional services is 
seen to arise and be sustained because it is in the interests of the members of the profession. It 
essentially allows for their cartel-like behavior (Benham and Benham, 1975).  As a result, the 
capture theory predicts that professional licensure should decrease the supply of professionals 
below social optimum, increase the prices charged by professionals, and increase existing 
professionals' incomes beyond marginal productivity, thus generating rents and quasi-rents 
(Stigler, 1971; McChesney, 1987; Olsen, 1999; Hadfield, 2000; Kleiner and Kudrle, 2000). 
 
The most successful groups in obtaining wealth transfers are likely to be small, usually single 
issue oriented and extremely well organized. On the other side, those who bear the cost of 
paying rents are large fractions of the population, difficult to organize and with information 
problems. When these conditions are met, wealth transfers are expected to take place from the 
public as a whole to the very well-organized interest groups.  
 
The government should protect the public from these interest groups but incentives to provide 
public interest legislation can be overcome by pressure by those benefiting from wealth 
transfers. Moreover, wealth transfers may not be recognized by the public in general and 
comparisons with other jobs and occupations can be difficult (Van den Bergh, 1993). Just take 
the case of confidence premium. Comparing figures about the income situation of professionals 
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hardly distinguish the confidence premium from pure rents. Unemployment within the 
profession below average unemployment could be an indication of rent-seeking but could just 
be that the population requires more professional services than other goods and services on 
average. Less regional variance with respect to payments could help to identify rent-seeking 
(payments less subject to local market and business conditions indicate some degree of market 
power), but at the same time it could be that the willingness to pay for health and legal 
professional services varies less across regions than for other goods and services. Market 
concentration indices for professional services can be constructed but are of course subject to 
the appropriate delimitation of the market (e.g., most large law firms are specialized in certain 
areas of the law) and the distortions of the public sector (e.g., the national health service is the 
major provider of medical services in many European countries).  
 
The fact that rent-seeking behavior is intrinsically difficult to identify, specially when there are 
sound public interest arguments for regulation to be made, makes rent-seeking and regulatory 
capture to be more likely. Nevertheless, it is possible to develop legal and political instruments 
to limit it. Promoting competition, in particular by making use of the internal European market 
(which should promote a free flow of professional services), auditing professional bodies 
(including comparative institutional analysis) or forcing the separation of the service function 
from the agency function (e.g., medical diagnosis and treatment by different medical doctors) 
certainly helps to mitigate the problem. 
 
2.4 A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THEORIES 
In contrast to both pure private and public interest theories, the public and the professionals 
have an impact on the existent forms and contents of professional regulation. Thus, 
professionals will sometimes, but not always, be able to use regulations to limit supply and 
generate rents. On the other hand, public interest will be pursued sometimes, but not always 
(Peltzman, 1976). In fact, public and private interest theories mirror two distinct historical 
phases on economic research, emphasizing the corrective and the redistributive roles of 
regulation. The distinction between these two theories has lost validity even in economic theory 
due to game theory and institutional research (Hägg, 1997) that combine both.  
 
Different institutional arrangements and regulations are consistent with both theories. In 
particular, self-regulation is not necessarily a sign of rent-seeking. Professional regulatory 
bodies are consistent with public interest theory. Identifying rent-seeking requires a more 
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3. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS -- HOW 
There are several possible institutional arrangements to correct for market failure in the market 
for professionals as well as avoid private capture. We categorize these solutions in three 
groups: 
 
3.1 Regulation by the Government 
3.2 Self-Regulation 
3.3 Regulation by Third Parties 
 
3.1 REGULATION BY THE GOVERNMENT 
Regulation by the government usually includes quality regulation, certification and licensing. 
The government could subsidize high quality suppliers to ensure that they remain in the market 
even if adverse selection persists. Unfortunately it does not guarantee that the higher quality 
service will actually be supplied due to moral hazard. Second, penalties can be imposed on low 
quality suppliers and entry to the market could be restricted to some adequate standard 
(Dingwall and Fenn, 1987). These regulations however require a regulatory agency that must 
avoid capture and be able to do what consumers cannot: assess quality and signal it to 
potential clients (Stephen and Love, 1999). Apart from simple mandatory disclosure measures 
(e.g., professional specialty, professional education) and prohibiting what seems obvious 
misleading advertising (e.g., saying one is a lawyer or a doctor when one is not), effective 
quality regulation by the government seems difficult to imagine.  
 
Under certification or licensing, a document (certificate or license) is awarded to an individual 
who satisfies certain conditions. These conditions may be education or training. The 
government as well as a private agency may certificate or license professionals, and regulate 
professional education, compulsory periods of training, and performance requirements.  
 
The difference between licensing and self-regulation is that while rules are issued by public 
authorities in both settings (since the professional body is entrusted with public authority), entry 
and performance are regulated by the state in the first case (eventually delegated to a private 
agency independent from the profession) and by the profession in the second case. The 
consequence is that self-regulation promotes strong professional association (as we know with 
lawyers and doctors) whereas licensing does not. A profession becomes only a real profession 
if it has the decisive power to fix remuneration; otherwise it is just a form of licensing (just like 
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The two arguments against licensing and thus making the case for self-regulation are the 
following: (a) It still does not solve the problem of asymmetric information because neither the 
government nor a private agency independent from the profession have better knowledge of 
the quality of the service the profession provides than the profession itself (though they might 
have better knowledge than the average consumer), (b) It is less flexible (in dynamic markets 
where innovation is important agencies should be able to change quickly) and generates costs 
to be borne by the government rather than by the profession itself (Miller, 1985). The second 
argument nevertheless has serious limitations. First, the profession can regulate fees to cover 
these costs (hence they will be borne by taxpayers or consumers in both cases). Second, rents 
created by the exercise of regulatory powers by the professional body can undermine flexibility. 
For example, rents may be used to successfully resist competition from other regulatory bodies 
offering more efficient rules (Curran, 1993).  
 
3.2 SELF-REGULATION 
Professional regulators have the necessary information to extract signals in markets for 
credence goods (the well-known specific knowledge argument by Miller, 1985) but can hardly 
avoid the ultimate form of regulatory capture. Yet this type of bodies persists in most 
jurisdictions. One view is that there is a social contract between the profession and the 
community in order to reduce moral hazard. Naturally safeguards are required in order to 
ensure the profession does not operate a cartel. Also various watchdogs are necessary 
(Dingwall and Fenn, 1987). Another view is that the reduction in costs of extracting information 
by professionals more than compensates for potential losses due to cartel-like behavior (Ogus, 
1995).  These potential losses can be mitigated if there is more than one professional body in 
competition with each other (nevertheless in most jurisdictions professional bodies have a 
national or local monopoly), a large heterogeneous profession (Shaked and Sutton, 1982), and 
adequate legal instruments (e.g., efficient tort law) (Danzon, 1985 and 1991; Gravelle, 1990). 
 
Though self-regulation solves the information problem we have discussed before, it is difficult 
not to expect that professional bodies use their regulatory powers to restrict competition 
somehow. Such rent-seeking behavior, alongside other significant costs of administering the 
regulatory system, causes a significant deadweight loss. 
 
In order to tackle this problem, we should have in mind four specific dilemmas: (a) It will be 
easier for professionals not to pass their better information and expertise to the users unless of 
course they have an interest in doing so (this will increase search costs for the consumers 
since asymmetric information will not be reduced), (b) Professionals will induce demand of 
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Control and enforcement of quality standards will not be very effective due to collusion (hence 
we should investigate for sanctions for malpractice), (d) Fees will be set above confidence 
premium. 
 
3.3 REGULATION BY PRIVATE PARTIES 
Alternatives to professional regulation have been proposed, most of them never implemented. 
One solution could be independent rating agencies designed by repeat purchasers to perform 
the agency function on behalf of infrequent consumers (Stephen and Love, 1996). Others 
suggest deregulation via competition that will generate quality signals with adequate liability 
rules and removal of informational barriers (Leffler 1978; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Carr and 
Mathewson, 1988; Van den Bergh and Faure, 1991; Miller and Macey, 1995). 
 
There has been a recent trend to relate effective regulation of professional services with 
litigation. The large scale of litigation in the US allows litigants to use their financial leverage to 
force changes of a regulatory nature and professionals to limit opportunism. If appropriate 
regulation does not exist for professional services, litigation can provide an effective substitute 
when it generates a transfer of wealth from the profession (the injurers) to the consumers (the 
injured) (Viscusi, 2002). Even so, there are important objections to the use of litigation as a way 
to stimulate effective regulation: (a) Consumers do not have the appropriate information to 
make a comprehensive analysis whether or not negligent behavior, reckless attitudes, or 
professional malpractices were exercised (thus, litigation will usually be an inferior substitute for 
regulation), (b) Consumers may be opportunistic when making decisions with respect to filing 
lawsuits and settling out of court (e.g., nuisance litigation), thus generating too much litigation, 
(c) Litigation may not create the adequate incentives for efficient levels of professional services 
since it usually aims at providing compensation, (d) Litigation may fail in achieving efficient risk-
sharing (restoring pre-accident levels of utility may not be possible, specially in the context of 
health effects).  
 
In the context of medical malpractice there is some further controversy concerning the 
effectiveness and efficiency of litigation. Kessler and McClellan (1996, 1997, 2002a, 2002c) 
have shown that malpractice liability provides important incentives for medical care. Doctors in 
areas with greater malpractice pressure tend to use more defensive medicine, better treatment 
and medical high productivity seems to be positively related to the willing of patients to litigate 
(Olsen, 1997). However, once the incentives for hospitals and managed care organizations are 
explicitly taken into account, the empirical results are less striking. In fact, there is some debate 
among economists over optimal liability rules for physicians and health organizations, though 
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for adequate performance (Danzon, 1997; Kessler and McClellan, 2002b; Agrawal and Hall, 
2003; Arlen and MacLeod, 2003).    
 
4. REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS -- WHAT 
Currently, the literature has been focusing on controlling regulatory instruments and reflecting 
the private interest nature of their use. These instruments are:  
 
4.1 Entry Restrictions with Consequent Professional Monopoly Rights  
4.2 Restrictions on Advertising and Other Means of Promoting Competition within the 
Profession  
4.3 Restrictions on Fees and on Fee Contracts 
4.4 Restrictions on Organizational Forms 
4.5 Restrictions on Conduct and Procedures  
 
4.1 ENTRY RESTRICTIONS 
Entry restrictions are justified in order to assure quality of professional services but on the other 
hand they undermine competition by creating professional monopoly rights (Shaked and 
Sutton, 1981; Van den Bergh, 1999). These restrictions require candidates to have specialized 
skills acquired by intellectual education at university (in Europe, after obtaining a university 
degree; in the US, after completing studies in a professional graduate school) and by training 
(for a mandatory period). These requirements of education (a specific diploma) and traineeship 
may be determined both by the government and the professional body.  
 
Controls over these requirements can be exercised at three levels: (a) By defining the content 
of intellectual and training requirements, (b) By exercising influence over the organizations that 
educate and perform training of professionals (Shepherd, 2000), (c) By evaluating candidates 
after education and training at an exam or other type of screening device (eventually subjecting 
admission to some kind of numerus clausus). From a public interest perspective, we would 
expect some control over entry requirements but no strong influence over organizations that 
educate and perform training as well as a strict examination of candidates. Some level of 
education and training is indeed positive since the relationship between human capital and high 
quality services is expected to be positive. Moreover, reliance on self-regulation may increase 
the specificity of human capital investment and individual commitment to the profession 
(Donabedian, 1995). 
 
Educational requirements do vary for lawyers. A law degree is enough for practicing law in 
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periods exist followed up by examination. Making licenses dependent on requirements of 
continuing education is not practiced, but professional associations run courses and seminars 
in joint ventures with law schools and law firms to help updating knowledge. It should be noted, 
nevertheless, than in Sweden and Finland there are no restrictions on who can provide legal 
advice and representation. 
 
Entry regulations are not very different across our sample of countries with respect to the 
medical profession, with the exception of the Netherlands where registration is not required. As 
a consequence, a complex insurance system has been developed in the Netherlands to protect 
consumers. One of the consequences is that now it is actually easier for a doctor registered in 
a professional body in another country of the European Union to practice medicine there than a 
Dutch doctor (because the insurance premium is much lower for the former). 
 
Entry restrictions can also apply to para-professionals (e.g., para-medicals or other legal 
professionals) under the argument they supply an inferior quality service. However, they also 
do it at lower prices. It turns out that the entry of low quality para-professionals could be welfare 
improving (Shaked and Sutton, 1981). In other words, restrictions on para-professionals are 
expected to be undesirable unless the profits of the profession are given a sufficiently high 
weight in the social welfare (Gehring and Jost, 1995). 
 
From our discussion it is clear that entry restrictions should be more similar to certification 
rather than a very comprehensive and strict examination of candidates before, during, and after 
education and training takes place. Notwithstanding, the absence of severe restrictions on entry 
does not necessarily imply competition. Professional markets tend to be spatially localized 
(Stephen and Love, 1999). Hence mobility might be seriously undercut and thus promote local 
monopolies (Pashigian, 1979). For example, in many jurisdictions lawyers may only appear 
before courts in the local area corresponding to the bar they have been admitted. In general in 
Europe lawyers can plead before any court. There are however limitations in United Kingdom, 
Germany and the United States.  
 
In Europe, many of the entry restrictions are in the process of being removed. The 
implementation of the Establishment Directive means that it is possible for lawyers and doctors 
qualified in one member state to become full members of the profession in another member 
state without further examinations, though for example it does not apply to mobility for the legal 
profession between United Kingdom jurisdictions (Stephen, 2003). In the United States, the 
lack of reciprocity between state bar associations seems to lead to lower number of practicing 
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European directives (namely Directive 77/249, Directive 89/48, and Directive 98/5) have been 
implemented in most countries for the legal profession. Entry restrictions can collide with 
competition law in Europe and anti-trust in the United States. For many years, entry regulations 
issued by professional bodies were not subject to competition authorities. In Europe, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) explicitly recognizes that professionals may be subject to 
higher standards of conduct, and therefore accepts some restrictions. However, whether or not 
competition rules apply will depend on whether the professional body could reasonably have 
considered the restriction adequate for the proper functioning of the profession. Hence simply 
showing that the restriction itself is not necessary for proper functioning does not suffice for 
enforcing competition law (Andrews, 2002). As follows from the Wouters case (309/99), the 
ECJ precludes two ways to regulate professions. Either the government has empowered the 
professional body to regulate the profession without the government being fully involved, or the 
government retains the power to adopt professional rules. Regarding the latter, these 
professional rules will be considered state measures and excluded from the scope of EU 
competition law. The United States case law however seems to point out in a different and 
more competitive direction by not tolerating outright collusion, for instance on prices, simply 
because it is the market for a professional service. 
 
European directives (namely Directive 93/16) have been growingly implemented for the medical 
profession. The medical diplomas and certificates obtained in any state of the European Union 
are recognized by each member state (Directive 93/16 complemented in details by Directive 
97/50, Directive 98/21, Directive 98/63 and Directive 99/46). After registration in the 
professional body, a physician can practice under the rules of the country (given the recognition 
by the ECJ of the so-called principle of double deontology). For example, given the shortage of 
physicians in Portugal and the high number of doctors in Spain, many Spanish doctors have 
made use of this European legislation to establish themselves in Portugal. 
 
Even though entry restrictions are important and significant, entry to legal and medical 
professions has continued to grow in most jurisdictions. Obviously what is important is the 
growth in supply relative to demand (Stephen, 2003). Nevertheless, we should notice that some 
empirical evidence points out that economic growth is negatively affected by more lawyers, the 
explanation being that their professional services do more redistribution than production 
(Murphy et. al., 1991).  
 
A quick overview of statistical data concerning professions confirms substantial differences 
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show the number of lawyers per 100,000 in several countries. One can see immediately that 
jurisdictions with less restrictive entry rules (Spain as well as the United States and the United 
Kingdom) have a substantially higher number of lawyers per capita, Greece being an exception 
(severe entry restrictions but high number). France, Austria and the Netherlands have a low 
figure, Japan having the lowest. 
 
According to international databases (Table two), Italy, Spain, Greece, and Belgium have the 
highest relative number of physicians. The United States and Norway, Switzerland and Japan 
have a low figure, the United Kingdom has the lowest. From Table three, it is clear that there 
has been a steady increase in the number of physicians in most countries, though the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Denmark and Japan below average. A more accurate statistics to 
measure the dynamics of entry is the number of doctors entering the workforce in the period 
1992-2000. It is the lowest in Portugal (European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 2000) 
and in the United States, see Table three.  
 
In Figure one, we offer a comparison of number of lawyers and physicians per 100,000. A 
positive correlation between the two measures is clear, most countries having more physicians 
than lawyers. There are however three notable exceptions. On one hand, Italy clearly has a 
much higher proportion of physicians than lawyers than every other country, whereas the 
United States and the United Kingdom come out on the opposite side, having a very number for 
lawyers and relatively low figure for physicians.  
 
4.2 RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING 
Restrictions on advertising can be justified under a public interest perspective inasmuch as they 
apply to other markets of goods and services. Advertising is a common method to provide 
information and, from a social welfare perspective, advertising should be allowed when it is 
productive, that is, it conveys important and relevant information to consumers concerning 
professional services. There is no reason to suppose that advertising of professional services 
should be subject to different regulations than those applied generally to other experience and 
credence goods and services. This argument conflicts with the claim used by professional 
bodies that advertising should be prohibited because it threatens the integrity and ethical 
responsibility of the profession by commercializing it. According to most professional 
associations, competition would be contrary to the dignity of the profession. However, as we 
observe in Europe, lawyers seem to be increasingly aware that dignity has a price. When 
Belgian lawyers seemed to lose business to Dutch and British law firms, the professional 
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Two kinds of advertising can be distinguished, price advertising being more controversial than 
quality advertising. When information about price is easier to obtain than information about 
quality (which is true for experience and credence goods but not for search goods), increasing 
the availability of price advertising might discourage quality competition and encourage price 
competition, leading to a degradation of the average quality in the market (Cave, 1985). This 
argument may support some restrictions on price advertising, but not necessarily banning it.    
 
The general conclusions of empirical evidence seem to be that restrictions on advertising 
increase the price of professional services and that the more advertising exists the lower the 
price is. However, there are several articles that contradict these findings (Rizo and 
Zeckhauser, 1992; Love and Stephen, 1996). There is no systematic evidence that 
distinguished between the effects of the two forms of advertising (Stephen, 2003). 
Nevertheless, quality advertising is much more common than price advertising (Stephen, Love 
and Peterson, 1994). 
 
Medical advertising is regulated in most jurisdictions, the United States and the United Kingdom 
being less restrictive and Portugal and Germany being the most restrictives. With the exception 
of announcement of opening or closing practice, listing in the phonebook and the nameplate 
(and even this one is clearly regulated in dimension and content), advertising is banned. 
Competitive pressure and publicity in the internet have led the professional bodies to issue new 
documents on publicity, clarifying the strictness of the rules justified by the so-called principle of 
non-commercialization of medical services and alleged protection of consumers. Advertising is 
allowed in Spain or Belgium as long as it does not convey false information or bad publicity to 
the medical profession. More difficult to understand is why in some countries physicians are not 
allowed advertising, but managed care organizations can do it. They operate in the same 
market for professional services and there is no economic reason to justify why physicians 
cannot advertise in price and quality but managed care organizations can. 
 
For legal professionals, price advertising is banned in most jurisdictions, except the United 
States (though regulated by each state bar), under the cover that comparative advertising is 
strictly prohibited. Quality advertising is usually allowed for partnership but not for sole 
practitioners. Competition within the European Union has pushed bars to relax somehow the 
constraints. Overall, the regulation of publicity for legal services is still more restrictive in 
Portugal, Spain and France and much less restrictive in the United Kingdom and the 
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The arguments against deregulation of publicity for legal services used by the professional 
bodies include: (a) publicity misleads the public and it has a negative effect on the quality of the 
profession (untrue of quality advertising and probably true in price advertising), (b) it is very 
expensive (we do not know since the current market is most likely very thin due to strict 
regulations), (c) it generates unfair competition because only the large law firms can benefit 
from advertising (the US experience shows otherwise), and (d) it is against professional ethics 
by violating the so-called principle of non-commercialization of legal services (Guedes da 
Costa, 2003). 
 
4.3 RESTRICTIONS ON FEES 
Restrictions on fees can be seen as way of assuring the confidence premium to professionals. 
Fees can be subject to control by the profession itself, by the courts or by the government by 
use of mandatory fee schedules. Over time, in most jurisdictions, mandatory scales have been 
transformed into recommendations. However, in Germany legal fees are still determined by the 
government. For a long time, in Belgium and the Netherlands a recommended legal fee 
schedule was produced by the professional body and in Belgium there was a recommended 
minimum, until competition pushed for the abolishment of such rules. Medical fees are set by 
the government in most public health services (e.g., NHS in the United Kingdom) or by 
managed healthcare organizations.  
   
Price fixing is very restrictive and not very common. Moreover, it is unclear if it enforces high 
quality production (it seems it would if quality were either high or low and with homogeneous 
consumer preferences, Maks and Philipsen, 2002). Recommended fees suggest a more 
sophisticated approach to cartel-like behavior. Though we would expect recommended fees to 
be seen as mandatory by the profession, the evidence provided by Shinnik and Stephen (2000) 
for conveyancing markets in Scotland and Ireland goes on the opposite direction. The authors 
nevertheless recognize that these markets satisfy the necessary conditions for successful 
deviations from collusive agreements. Another possibility is that recommended fees provide a 
focal point against which professionals discount thus colluding at a lower level (Stephen, 2003).  
 
Limitations on fee contracts (e.g., contingent fee contracts in the market for lawyers is forbidden 
in Europe) are more difficult to justify on the basis of quality assurance. Moreover, the 
enforcement of limitations on fee contracts is costly and generates incentives for bargaining on 
the shadow of the law (e.g., informal contingent fees in Europe). In fact contingent fees for both 
legal and medical professional services would solve the moral hazard problem. The 
fundamental argument put against contingent fee contracts in the legal profession is that they 
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There could be a conflict of interest between client and lawyer over if and when to settle. The 
determination of an appropriate fee if settlement takes place would of course solve the 
problem. Also, we would expect well-informed clients to prefer an hourly fee contract (and avoid 
conflict over settlement) whereas less experienced litigants would prefer contingent fee 
contracts. 
 
With respect to legal fees, in most countries prices can be freely negotiated and usually more 
competent lawyers charge higher fees, except in Germany. Recommended fees existed at 
some point in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Fees are usually based on hours 
worked, litigation value (except in Belgium), and complexity of the case. Contingent fees are 
allowed in the United States but not in Europe. Usually legal fees take the form of hourly fees or 
flat fees. A first exception was developed in the United Kingdom where a lawyer receives an 
up-rating on the normal fee if the case is won which is not related to the value of damages 
(conditional fees). Similar arrangements are now being allowed in many countries. The 
introduction  of contingent fees is under consideration in the Netherlands. 
 
As to medical fees, Germany alongside with Portugal and the Netherlands have the least 
competitive market (in the Dutch case, it could just be the consequence of no registration and 
expensive insurance schemes). Nevertheless, European countries have a powerful national 
health service that effectively restrains fee competition. The same does not happen in the 
United States, where fees can be freely negotiated. 
 
Professional bodies can also manage the subsidies the government supplies to consumers of 
professional services, usually the national health service for health services and legal aid for 
legal services. The costs of legal aid and national health services have been growing rapidly. 
Usually it is caused by the increasing number of cases, rather than by fees paid to lawyers or 
physicians. Though these fees are usually much lower than normal fees, the profession can 
use them as a way of attracting consumers. Professionals have no clear incentive to avoid 
using government subsidies to generate oversupply of services.  
 
Legal aid in particular is usually run by independent government funded bodies (e.g., the 
Netherlands and the United States), legal aid boards (e.g., Scotland and Spain) or courts (e.g., 
Germany), the exceptions being Belgium and the new system in Portugal where legal aid is 
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4.4 RESTRICTIONS ON ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 
Special regulations apply to law and medical firms. Restrictions on organizational forms are 
difficult to justify by public interest. If some aspects of professional services may favor 
partnerships rather than incorporation, we should expect the market to solve that, not the 
professional body. 
 
Common organizational restrictions exclude incorporation (even where incorporation is 
permitted usually unlimited liability is maintained and the directors of the firm must be 
professionals) and multidisciplinary partnerships (i.e., involving members of more than one 
profession) from possible organizational forms. The usual justification for these restrictions is 
agency costs. Effort in production and quality are difficult to measure by others outside of the 
profession, thus making sole practitioners or professional partnerships the most likely form of 
organization where adequate incentives will be less costly to be designed (Carr and 
Mathewson, 1990; Matthews, 1991). The problem of course is that by banning other 
organizational forms, specialization of professionals beyond particular aspects of their service 
(thus lowering the cost of providing services) and economies of scope (by providing a ``one 
stop shopping" including lawyers, accountants, surveyors or medical doctors, dentists, and 
beauty consultants) are lost. For example, in the European countries where multidisciplinary 
partnerships are permitted, commercial law is increasingly dominated by the legal branch of the 
major international accounting firms (Stephen, 2002). 
 
A second type of restrictions on organizational form concern the separation between the 
service function (assess or diagnosis the problem) and the agency function (implement the 
correct solution). This separation limits opportunism and creates incentives for reveal of 
information (Emons, 1997). However, it can be seen as prohibition on vertical integration 
between different stages in production, thus generating costs in terms of technology 
(economies of scale) and agency costs (hold-up problem). The issue then is whether or not the 
benefits from formally separating the roles outweigh the costs (Stephen, 2003).  
 
In the United Kingdom, as well as in Ireland and most of Australia, the legal profession has two 
branches: solicitors and barristers. Solicitors provide legal advice to the public and have rights 
of audience in the lower courts. Barristers have the rights of audience in higher courts and can 
be commissioned to advise solicitors, and they provide the majority of judges in the higher 
courts in later stages of their career. A member of one profession cannot become a member of 
the other. The debate over the efficiency of separating the legal profession in the United 
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The structure of legal firms in Europe has been changing since the 90s. Sole practitioners or 
small professional partnerships have been growingly replaced by large professional 
partnership, corporations (where they are allowed) and multidisciplinary organizations. The 
entry of foreigner law firms or partnerships in the market for legal services is not helped by 
current regulations in some countries where the use of original denomination as well as original 
organizational form are allowed under certain limited conditions.  
 
4.5 RESTRICTIONS ON CONDUCT 
The introduction of professional standards and ethics generates a number of costs, including 
administrative costs (defining, monitoring, and enforcing quality), compliance costs (from 
fulfilling professional obligations), and opportunity costs (since opportunistic behavior is 
restricted) (Ogus, 1994). 
 
Professionals are expected to pursue an agenda to minimize these costs. They will lobby for 
their own quality level and standards (Hau and Thum, 2000). A standard can be an effective 
mechanism to protect insiders from competitors by imposing their own quality standard thus 
reducing to zero compliance costs. On the other hand, a conflict between the government and 
the professions with respect to accepting and formally observing conduct rules is not likely, 
because professionals are usually involved in the actual formation of these rules (Maks and 
Philipsen, 2002).   
 
Administrative costs will depend on how the professional body regulates the conduct of 
professionals. Many forms of conduct regulation can be found in the professional rules. A code 
usually describes the tasks and duties of the profession and is often called professional ethics. 
The professional body also establishes disciplinary procedures in case the restrictions on 
conduct are violated. These rules usually define under which conditions professionals might be 
sanctioned and eventually expelled from the profession.  
 
There are two reasons why the enforcement of restrictions on conduct is not expected to be 
high. First, it is not a problem of controlling entry, but rather of controlling exit. There are clear 
incentives to avoid conflicts within the profession and make exit too easy. Second, the 
alternative mechanisms (litigation in court) still rely too much on the profession. By controlling 
the production of expert witnesses (directly, by providing and managing expert witnesses; 
indirectly, by training them), the professional body may block any attempt to force physicians 
and lawyers to leave the profession for violating professional conduct or gross malpractice. 
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liability, however it is difficult for judges to make a decision on medical malpractice or 
negligence in preparing a lawsuit if expert witnesses are not available. 
   
Some limitations to the discretion professional bodies have in dealing with restrictions on 
conduct have been emerging out of international professional federations (though these are 
mostly recommendations) and to some extent by EU directives on professional services (not 
surprisingly usually perceived by professionals as intrusions into national legal and medical 
culture). However, evidence points out that most disciplinary actions are taken for lack of 
dignity or improper behavior towards other professionals rather than professional malpractice 
(Faure, 1993; Hellingman, 1993). 
 
In the United States, lawsuits for medical negligence are quite too frequent nowadays (some 
people talk about a medical malpractice crisis), but were very infrequent 50 years ago. 
Physician liability existing prior to 1960s might actually have been too low, resulting from 
capture and the consequent use of self-regulation to deny expert witnesses testimony in 
malpractice cases. However, after the 1960s, it became much easier to obtain expert witnesses 
due to the erosion of local medical societies in disciplining unethical practices and local rules 
(Olsen, 1997). The consequence was a blow up of litigation over medical malpractice and thus 
the current need for tort reform in medical negligence (Miller, 1997; Dauer and Marcus, 1997; 
Sloan and Hall, 2002; Fine, 2003). Liability for medical malpractice is also of growing 
importance in European tort litigation. Contrary to the United States experience, the medical 
malpractice explosion does not seem to have come to an end yet (Faure and Koziol, 2001). 
 
Liability for medical negligence is extremely complex in many European countries. First, it can 
be contractual (breach of contract in the private sector) or extra-contractual liability (negligence 
for doctors in the national health system). Whereas for contractual liability, the patient has a 
longer period to sue the physician after the wrongdoing, for extra-contractual liability, the same 
period is typically much shorter. Such liability dichotomy exists in England and Wales, but the 
development of expert witnessing and the structure of the legal system has not produced the 
chilling effect that is observed in other countries such as Portugal. The problem in some 
continental European countries is that whereas for doctors in the private sector, law 
enforcement is exercised by regular courts, doctors in the national health service are under the 
jurisdiction of administrative courts. Given that many physicians work for the national health 
service but practice privately in part-time, conflicts and questions of court jurisdiction usually 
take place when patients want to sue doctors. Not surprisingly, lawsuits for medical negligence 
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4.6 A GUIDELINE FOR RESEARCH ON RENT-SEEKING 
Table four summarizes most of the discussion we have presented. It also suggests some 
guidelines to identify rent-seeking behavior from the profession. We will use these results while 
presenting the methodology developed for comparative analysis of professions. 
 
5. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Given the very distinct institutional details, ranking the different institutional frameworks is a 
difficult and controversial task. Some comparative law scholars seem to be opposed to the idea 
of building indicators for law and legal institutions (Siems, 2004). Obviously, some institutional 
details are lost and legal complexity is reduced by providing comparable indicators. 
Nevertheless, a comparative institutional analysis cannot be reasonably influential without 
providing testable results.  
 
Following the methodology proposed by Faure et. al. (1993), we construct a comparative 
institutional ranking of the regulations of professional services. The interpretations of the 
indicators should be very careful having in mind that it depends crucially on the questions 
surveyed (which do not cover all institutional details) and the relative importance we give to 
each set of questions (we try to correct somehow for this problem by presenting different 
weighted averages).  
 
The process by which we construct a market failure approach index is the following:  A country 
gets a point if the answer to the question complies with the market failure approach and zero 
otherwise. Complying with the market failure approach means that the answer to the question 
is consistent with improving market performance (as summarized in Table four). Our index is 
based on a a set of questions (Tables nine and ten). They are a modified version of Faure et. 
al. (1993) where questions concerning professional schools, management of legal aid in the 
case of lawyers, and malpractice litigation have been included. We also eliminated some 
questions that in our view were duplications. 
 
Details on the United States, the United Kingdom [England and Wales], the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Germany regulatory framework for the legal and medical professions can be found 
at Faure et. al. (1993). For legal services, a detailed report for Denmark, Italy, France, the 
United Kingdom [England and Wales] and Germany is available at Paterson et. al. (2003).  We 
present detailed references to Spain and Portugal in Garoupa (2004).
1 Information concerning 
 
                                                 
1 For the Portuguese and Spanish cases, the questionnaire was mailed to the Portuguese and Spanish law 
bars (Ordem dos Advogados and Consejo General de la Abogacia Española) and the Portuguese and 
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Switzerland (for the medical profession), Norway, France, Belgium and Netherlands, Portugal 
and Austria was also obtained by local experts. 
 
 
5.1 THE QUESTIONNAIRE  
The questions are divided across the five dimensions we have considered in previous sections: 
entry, organization, price, advertising, and conduct regulations. 
 
Most of the information used to answer this questionnaire for the United States, the United 
Kingdom [England and Wales], Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands (except questions four 
and twenty-one for doctors and questions four, thirteen, and twenty-one for lawyers) has been 
made available at Faure et. al. (1993) and Paterson et. al. (2003), the latter only for the legal 
profession.  In Faure et. al. (1993), the data was obtained by direct questionnaire to local 
experts in the five countries analyzed, in some cases the authors of the respective chapter in 
the book. In Paterson et. al. (2003), questionnaires were sent to the fifteen national law bars. In 
some very minor cases, we note inconsistencies between those two sets of information. 
 
The construction of our index is based on the spirit of Table four. Therefore, a certain number 
of points is assigned every time the answer to the question means promotion of free 
competition or no existence of regulation, unless that regulation is clearly consistent with the 
market failure approach. Some points might be more controversial, so we look at them in more 
detail here: 
 
Question One: Registration and licensing seem to be the most efficient way for regulating the 
market for legal and medical services (Ogus, 1994, page 221).  Insurance is an expensive 
alternative (e.g., the Dutch medical profession). 
 
Question Two: After obtaining a degree in Law or in Medicine, additional training and further 
examination controlled by the professional body seems unnecessary. 
 
Question Three: Submitting the right to practice as a doctor or as a lawyer to periodical review 
would certainly indicate rent-seeking motivation (control of the profession) and can hardly be 
justified on efficiency grounds. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Médicos). Only the Portuguese law bar replied and the information provided by them was used to compile 
the answers. For the other three cases, we have used information available by means of codes of 
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Question Four: Product differentiation is a signal of competition whereas product homogeneity 
imposed administratively by the Government or the professional body has no substantive 
efficiency justification. 
 
Question Seventeen: Continuing education is expected to raise the quality of the professional 
service. Mandatory continuing education is efficient in the absence of market incentives (due to 
asymmetry of information). 
 
Question Eighteen: Keeping records and mandatory disclosure of those records to the 
disciplinary body cannot be justified for efficiency reasons since professionals should be free to 
decide on what type of information they want to record and eventually disclose. These rules 
increase production cost (hence prices) with no obvious gain for customers, either legal clients 
or patients. 
  
5.2 OUR FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO LAWYERS 
We provide a summary of our own cross-national comparisons as well as a detailed analysis of 
previous research by Faure et. al. (1993) and Paterson et. al. (2003).  
 
Tables five and six present the results for each regulatory instrument. Besides a simple index 
constructed by adding up the points obtained in the twenty-one questions, we have considered 
two weighted averages, the first where the same weight is given to each regulatory 
intervention, and the second where entry restrictions get 50% and each of the other four gets 
12.5%. The former is constructed to overcome the problem that the number of questions varies 
for different regulatory interventions, the latter aims at taking into account the fact that 




With respect to lawyers, we can immediately see that the United States regulatory framework 
seems closer to improving market performance for legal services than most European 
jurisdictions essentially due to the fact that the United States is not so much regulated and is 
more competitive. Within the EU we identify three groups: the Netherlands and Belgium that 
seem to have a regulatory framework producing a result similar to the United States, a second 
group of jurisdictions (Norway, England and Wales, France, and Spain) with a performance 
below the United States and Benelux countries but clearly above the performance of the third 
group (Portugal, Germany, and Austria). Germany's result is justified by excessive regulation of 
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fees. In the case of Austria and Portugal, we should add excessive restrictions on 
organizational forms.  
 
It should be noticed that there are no major ranking differences across the three indicators, with 
the Netherlands and Belgium on one hand and Germany and France on the other hand 
changing positions when more weight is given to entry restrictions.  
 
The overall result for the United States-Europe comparison is not surprising. European law bars 
subscribe to a professional code (the so-called Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European 
Union) that provides minimum common standards, though it is recognized (it says in its 
preamble that it is not possible nor desirable) that a general unified regulatory framework 
should not be developed. Common standards include: (a) Personal advertising and publicity is 
forbidden unless explicitly allowed by the local bar; (b) Contingent fees (pactum de quota litis) 
are banned; (c) Multidisciplinary partnerships are restricted since lawyers cannot share 
honorariums and fees with other professionals unless explicitly allowed by the local bar; (d) 
Lawyers should not conflict with other lawyers, but if they do, the local bar should be asked to 
intervene before the case goes for litigation; (e) A lawyer should not accept instructions to 
represent a client in substitution for another lawyer in relation to a certain matter if the client has 
not fully paid and reimbursed the first lawyer. The Code also refers to the “corporate spirit of the 
profession" by which a relationship of trust and cooperation should be developed (a principle 
regulated under the name of duty of solidarity among lawyers).  
 
More recently, the association of European law bars has emphasized that: (a) Contingent fees 
(i.e., an agreement between a lawyers and his client by virtue of which the client undertakes to 
pay the lawyer a share of the result regardless of whether in the form of money or any other 
benefit) being forbidden is a necessary rule of the profession; (b) Fee sharing with non-lawyers 
is a consequence of the duty of confidentiality and avoidance of conflicts, thus multidisciplinary 
partnerships should not be permitted since they offend the core values of the profession; (c) 
These restrictions cannot be considered a restriction of competition under EU competition law 
since they are applied in the specific context of a profession; (d) Comparative conclusions with 
respect to different regulations across Europe should be avoided because they follow from 
legal and cultural intrinsic differences, and are respected by the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
(CCBE Response to the European Commission Competition Questionnaire on Regulation in 
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5.3 OUR FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO PHYSICIANS 
With respect to physicians, we can see that the United States regulatory framework again 
seems closer to improving market performance for medical services than most European 
jurisdictions. Within the EU we identify two groups: the first group (Norway, France, England 
and Wales, Switzerland, Belgium, and Spain slightly below) with a performance below the 
United States but clearly above the performance of the second European group (Portugal, the 
Netherlands, Austria and Germany). Most of these results are consistent with previous 
evaluations, with the exception of the Netherlands. This is essentially due to the fact that we 
mark as negative the Dutch system having no registration (since the market failure approach 
relies on some degree of consumer protection). Looking at the cases of Austria, Germany and 
Portugal, the reasons for performing so badly are very severe restrictions on fees, advertising, 
and organizational forms. 
 
Contrary to rankings for legal services, it should be noticed that there are important ranking 
differences across the three indicators, the only consistent results being the United States as 
first, Spain as number seven, and Portugal as last in all three indices. Major changes are 
observed for Belgium (gets to the third position when entry restrictions have more weight and 
falls to number six otherwise), France (gets to the second position when entry restrictions have 
more weight, but falls up to number five in the weighted average indicator), Norway and 
Switzerland (number five and six respectively when entry restrictions have more weight, but 
number two and three in the weighted average indicator). Such observations indicate that while 
Belgium and France seem to have less restrictive entry regulations than Norway or 
Switzerland, the opposite happens with other regulatory interventions (namely, fees, 
advertising, and conduct). Minor changes are noted for Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria. 
 
In figures 2 and 3, we plot the weighted indices for both professions (lawyer and physician). 
Immediately we can see that the United States comes out as having the most efficient 
regulatory setup for professions, followed by a group of European countries including Belgium, 
England and Wales, Norway, and at some distance by France and Spain. Clearly, Germany, 
Austria and Portugal form a second European group that performs badly in the current exercise 
(notice that Switzerland is not included due to the lack of information for assessing regulation of 
the legal profession). The Netherlands comes out as an outlier with efficiency problems 
concerning the regulation of the medical profession. 
 
5.4 RELATIONS BETWEEN INDICES 
Our rankings are close but do not match exactly the rankings offered at Faure et. al. (1993) for 
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in our view are less compelling, (b) We average out questions within the survey by relevant 
item while they simply add all questions with equal weight (therefore the issues covered with 
more questions carry more weight in their final ranking), and (c) We include other aspects of 
the regulatory setup (professional education, professional litigation and the management of 
legal aid in the sample countries). 
 
In Tables seven and eight we present the results for libertarian (Faure a), efficiency (Faure c), 
and consumer protection (Faure b) as well as their rankings for a sample of five countries 
(England and Wales, the United States, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany). The 
libertarian index measures the absence of restrictive rules, the optimal framework being free 
competition without any limits. One point is assigned whenever a regulation is not used in a 
country and zero is assigned whenever the regulation is enforced. The efficient index looks for 
regulations only for market failures commonly accepted in economics (therefore, this is the 
index closer in spirit to ours). Finally, the consumer protection index accepts regulations that a 
country adopts in order to minimize losses of welfare for consumers thought at the expense of 
freedom of competition.  
 
Paterson et. al. (2003) also provide an index of regulation for different professions based on 
entry (IAS entry) and conduct (IAS conduct) restrictions. They measure how much a given 
profession is regulated, hence producing a result somehow similar to the libertarian index 
provided by Faure et. al. (1993). The entry and conduct indices are aggregated in a composite 
index which we do not present since it is just the sum of the points obtained in each of the 
regulation indices.  
 
In Table seven we can see the ranking for the legal profession (the medical profession was 
excluded from their project though there was the intention of carrying on such study in the 
original proposal) for a sample of fifteen countries (all current members of the European Union). 
We compare their indices with our entry indicator (first line of Table five) and a simple 
aggregation of the other four regulatory interventions (adding-up from second to fifth lines on 
Table five).  Notice that the conduct index takes into account fewer aspects than ours. Their 
ranking does not always match ours because we look at improving market performance given 
the existence of a market failure. Hence we look at quantitative issues (e.g., number of 
restrictions), but also at quality and nature of regulatory instruments and constraints.  
 
Notably, five countries have a different performance in our ranking than previous exercises. 
Spain and France perform considerably better in our assessment, Portugal and England and 
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setup, in particular we pay more attention to structure of law firms, advertising, and conduct 
than Paterson et. al. (2003). With respect to Belgium, the differences are essentially due to the 
recent changes operated in the regulatory setup for legal professional services in this country. 
 
In Table eight, we have the comparative institutional analysis for physicians. Our rankings are 
fairly consistent with previous research. For reasons discussed previously, the Netherlands is 
the only relevant exception performing less well in our ranking than in Faure et. al. (1993). US 




In this paper we have presented a systematized summary of the economic literature on 
regulation of professionals, with a special application to legal and medical services. A 
comparative analysis of medical and legal professional bodies has been developed for US and 
Europe. A set of indices to measure quality of the regulatory set-up has been constructed 
where aspects related to entry, fees, organizational forms, advertising, and conduct restrictions 
are included. A country getting a higher number of points is interpreted to have a professional 
regulatory framework more consistent with improving market performance (given the existence 
of a market failure). 
 
The United States perform well in our study, closely followed by Norway, England and Wales, 
and then by Belgium, France, and Spain. Austria, Germany and Portugal perform less well, but 
evidence suggests that for legal services they are not too far away from the EU average 
whereas for medical services they are clearly below average. The Netherlands, for the medical 
profession, ranks poorly due to our view concerning the lack of registration whereas for the 
legal professions performs quite well. Switzerland also performs fairly well for the medical 
profession (unfortunately no information was obtained for the legal profession). 
 
Some policy conclusions can be extracted from the exercise with respect to the European 
Union. For the legal profession, the European Union should look at Belgium and the 
Netherlands as good examples of regulatory setups. With respect to the medical profession, 
Norway, Switzerland, and England and Wales seem to be the examples to have in mind. 
Altogether, it should be noticed that the United States performs extremely well for both 
professions. Finally, in a quick comparison across professions (some care should be exerted in 
drawing policy conclusions from a direct comparison of indicators for the legal and medical 
professions), it seems that on average European countries have less efficient regulatory setups 








Regulation of Professions in US and Europe: A Comparative Analysis 
   
REFERENCES 
 
Agrawal, G. B. and Hall, M. A., 2003, What if You Could Sue Your HMO? Managed Care 
Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield, St. Louis University Law Journal 47. 
 
Andrews, P., 2002, Self-Regulation by Professions - The Approach Under EU and US 
Competition Rules, European Competition Law Review 23.  
 
Arlen, J. and MacLeod, B., 2003, Torts, Expertise and Authority: Liability of Physicians and 
Managed Care Organizations, New York University Law Review, forthcoming. 
  
Benham, L. and Benham, A., 1975, Regulating Through the Professions: A Perspective on 
Information Control, Journal of Law and Economics 18, 421-447.  
 
Bishop, W., 1989, Regulating the Market for Legal Services in England: Enforced Separation of 
Function and Restrictions on Forms of Enterprise, Modern Law Review 52, 326-351. 
 
Bowles, R., 1994, The Structure of the Legal Profession in England and Wales, Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy 10, 18-33. 
 
Carr, J. and Mathewson, G. F., 1988, Unlimited Liability as a Barrier to Entry, Journal of 
Political Economy 96, 766-784. 
 
Carr, J. and Mathewson, G. F., 1990, The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the Legal 
Organization of Firms, Journal of Law and Economics 33, 307-330. 
 
Cave, M., 1985, Market Models and Consumer Protection, Journal of Consumer Policy, 335-
351. 
 
Curran, C., 1993, The American Experience with Self-Regulation in the Medical and Legal 
Professions, in Regulation of Professions, Antwerpen, Maklu. 
 
Danzon, P. M., 1985, Liability and Liability Insurance for Medical Malpractice, Journal of Health 







Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressNuno Garoupa 
Regulation of Professions in US and Europe: A Comparative Analysis 
Danzon, P. M., 1991, Liability for Medical Malpractice, Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, 51-
69. 
 
Danzon, P. M., 1997, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care?, Journal of Legal Studies 
27, 491-519. 
  
Darby, M. R. and Karni, E., 1973, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, Journal 
of Law and Economics 16, 111-126. 
 
Dauer, E. A. and Marcus, L. J., 1997, Adapting Mediation to Link Resolution of Medical 
Malpractice Dispute with Health Care Quality Improvement, Law and Contemporary Problems 
60, 185-218. 
 
Dingwall, R. and Fenn, P. T., 1987, A Respectable Profession? Sociological and Economic 
Perspectives on the Regulation of Professional Services, International Review of Law and 
Economics 7, 51-64.  
 
Donabedian, B., 1995, Self-Regulation and the Enforcement of Professional Codes, Public 
Choice 85, 107-118. 
 
Emons, W., 1997, Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts, RAND Journal of Economics 28, 
107-119. 
 
Faure, M., 1993, Regulation of Attorneys in Belgium, in Regulation of Professions, Antwerpen, 
Maklu. 
 
Faure, M., Finsinger, J., Siegers, J., and Van den Bergh, R., 1993, Regulation of Professions, 
Antwerpen, Maklu. 
 
Faure, M. and Koziol, H., 2001, Cases on Medical Malpractice in a Comparative Perspective, 
Tort and Insurance Law, Vienna, Springer-Verlag. 
 
Fine, D. K., 2003, Physician Liability and Managed Care: A Philosophical Perspective, Georgia 
State University Law Review 19. 
 
Garoupa, N., 2004, Regulation of Professions in Portugal: A Case-Study in Rent-Seeking, Bank 







Regulation of Professions in US and Europe: A Comparative Analysis 
 
Gehrig, T. and Jost, P., 1995, Quacks, Lemons, and Self Regulation: A Welfare Analysis, 
Journal of Regulatory Economics 7, 309-325. 
 
Grajzl, P. and Murrell, P., 2004, Lawyers and Politicians: The Impact of Organized Legal 
Professions on Institutional Reforms, University of Maryland mimeograph. 
  
Gravelle, H., 1990, Medical Negligence: Evaluating Alternative Regimes, Geneva Papers on 
Risk and Insurance 15, 22-26. 
 
Guedes da Costa, O., 2003, Direito Profissional do Advogado, Lisbon, Almedina Editora. 
 
Hadfield, G., 2000, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 
Michigan Law Review 98, 953-1006. 
 
Hägg, G. T., 1997, Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a 
European Perspective, European Journal of Law and Economics 4, 337-370. 
 
Hau, H. and Thum, M., 2000, Lawyers, Legislation and Social Welfare, European Journal of 
Law and Economics 9, 231-254. 
  
Hellingman, K., 1993, An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of Lawyers in the Netherlands, 
in Regulation of Professions, Antwerpen, Maklu. 
 
Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S., 2002, Fairness versus Welfare, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press.  
 
Kessler, D., and McClellan, M., 1996, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 111, 353-390. 
 
Kessler, D., and McClellan, M., 1997, The Effects of Malpractice Pressure and Liability Reforms 
on Physicians' Perceptions of Medical Care, Law and Contemporary Problems 60, 81-106. 
 
Kessler, D. and McClellan, M., 2002a, Malpractice Pressure, Managed Care, and Physician 








Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressNuno Garoupa 
Regulation of Professions in US and Europe: A Comparative Analysis 
Kessler, D. and McClellan, M., 2002b, How Liability Law Affects Medical Productivity, Journal of 
Health Economics 21, 931-955. 
 
Kessler, D. and McClellan, M., 2002c, Malpractice Law and Health Care Reform: Optimal 
Liability Policy in an Era of Managed Care, Journal of Public Economics. 
 
Klein, B. and Leffler, K. B., 1981, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual 
Performance, Journal of Political Economy 89, 615-641.  
 
Kleiner, M. and Kudrle, R. T., 2000, Does Regulation Affect Economic Outcomes? The Case of 
Dentistry, Journal of Law and Economics 43, 547-582. 
 
Leffler, K. B., 1978, Physician Licensure: Competition and Monopoly in American Medicine, 
Journal of Law and Economics 21, 165-186. 
 
Leland, H. E., 1979, Quack, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 
Journal of Political Economy 87, 1325-1346. 
 
Love, J. and Stephen, F., 1996, Advertising, Price and Quality in Self-Regulating Professions: A 
Survey, International Journal of the Economics of Business 3, 227-247. 
 
Lueck, D., Olsen, R. and Ransom, M., 1995, Market and Regulatory Forces in the Pricing of 
Legal Services, Journal of Regulatory Economics 7, 63-83. 
 
Maks, J. A. H. and Philipsen, N. J., 2002, An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of 
Professions, in The Regulation of Architects, Antwerpen, Intersentia. 
 
Matthews, R., 1991, The Economics of Professional Ethics: Should the Professions be more 
like Businesses?, Economic Journal 101, 737-750. 
 
McChesney, F., 1987, Rent Extraction and Rent creation in the Economic Theory of 
Regulation, Journal of Legal Studies 26, 101-118. 
 
Miller, F. H., 1997, Medical Discipline in the Twenty-First Century: Are Purchasers the 








Regulation of Professions in US and Europe: A Comparative Analysis 
Miller, J., 1985, The FTC and Voluntary Standards: Maximizing the Net Benefits of Self-
Regulation, The Cato Journal 4, 897-903.  
 
Miller, G. and Macey, J. R., 1995, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a Regulatory 
State, George Washington Law Review 63. 
 
Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1991, The Allocation of Talent: Implications for 
Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 503-530. 
 
Noll, R., 1989, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in Handbook of Industrial 
Organization II, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1253-1287. 
 
Ogus, A., 1993, Regulation of the Legal Profession in England and Wales, in Regulation of 
Professions, Antwerpen, Maklu. 
 
Ogus, A., 1994, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Ogus, A., 1995, Rethinking Self-regulation, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15, 97-108. 
 
Olsen, R. N., 1997, The Efficiency of Medical Malpractice Law: A New Appraisal, Research in 
Law and Economics 19. 
 
Olsen, R. N., 1999, The Regulation of Medical Professions, in Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics, Ghent, University of Ghent, 1018-1053. 
 
Paterson, I., Fink, M., and Ogus, A., 2003, Economic Impact of Regulation in the Field of 
Liberal Professions in Different Member States, Study for the European Commission, DG 
Competition, Vienna, Institute for Advanced Studies. 
 
Peltzman, S., 1976, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Journal of Law and 
Economics 19, 211-244. 
 
Pashigian, B. P., 1979, Occupational Licensing and the Interstate Mobility of Professionals, 







Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressNuno Garoupa 
Regulation of Professions in US and Europe: A Comparative Analysis 
Posner, R. A., 1974, Theories of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 5, 335-358. 
 
Posner, R. A., 1975, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, Journal of Political 
Economy 83, 807-827. 
 
Rizzo, J. A. and Zeckhauser, R. J., 1992, Advertising and the Price, Quantity and Quality of 
Primary Physician Services, Journal of Human Resources 28, 381-421. 
 
Rubin, P. H. and Bailey, M. J., 1994, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, Journal of 
Legal Studies 23, 807-831. 
 
Shaked, A. and Sutton, J., 1981, The Self-Regulating Profession, Review of Economic Studies 
47, 217-234.   
 
Shaked, A. and Sutton, J., 1982, Imperfect Information, Perceived Quality, and the Formation 
of Professional Groups, Journal of Economic Theory 27, 170-181.   
 
Sheperd, G. B., 2000, Cartels and Controls in Legal Training, Antitrust Bulletin 45, 437-466. 
 
Shinnick, E. and Stephen, F., 2000, Professional Cartels and Scale Fees: Chiselling on the 
Celtic Fringe?, International Review of Law and Economics 20, 407-423. 
 
Siems, M. M., 2004, Numerical Comparative Law, Do We Need Statistical Evidence in Law in 
Order to Reduce Complexity?, Law Department, European University Institute mimeograph. 
 
Sloan, F. A. and Hall, M. A., 2002, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation of 
Managed Care, Law and Contemporary Problems 65, 169-208.   
 
Stephen, F., 2002, The European Single Market and the Regulation of the Legal Profession: An 
Economic Analysis, Managerial and Decision Economics 23, 115-125. 
 
Stephen, F., 2003, An Economic Perspective on the Regulation of Legal Service Markets, 









Regulation of Professions in US and Europe: A Comparative Analysis 
Stephen, F. and Love, J., 1996, Deregulation of Legal Services in the UK: Evidence from 
Conveyancing, Hume Papers on Public Policy 4, 53-66.  
 
Stephen, F. and Love, J., 1999, Regulation of the Legal Profession, in Encyclopedia of Law 
and Economics, Ghent, University of Ghent, 987-1017. 
 
Stephen, F., Love, J., and Peterson, A., 1994, Deregulation of Conveyancing Markets in 
England and Wales, Fiscal Studies 15, 102-118. 
 
Stigler, G., 1971, The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 2, 3-21.  
 
Van den Bergh, R., 1993, Self-Regulation in the Medical and Legal Professions and the 
European Internal Market in Progress, in Regulation of Professions, Antwerpen, Maklu. 
 
Van den Bergh, R., 1999, Self-Regulation of the Medical and Legal Professions: Remaining 
Barriers to Competition and EC Law, in Organized Interests and Self-Regulation: An Economic 
Approach, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Van den Bergh, R. and Faure, M., 1991, Self-Regulation of the Professions in Belgium, 
International Review of Law and Economics 11, 165-182.    
 
Viscusi, W. K., 2002, Overview, in Regulation through Litigation, Washington, DC, AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. 
 
Zerbe, R. and Urban, N., 1988, Including Public Interest in Theories of Regulation, Research in 







Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressNuno Garoupa 
Regulation of Professions in US and Europe: A Comparative Analysis 
 
TABLE 1 – NUMBER OF LAWYERS PER 100,000
COUNTRY  1983  1990  2000  %  1983-2000
US 250  261  338  35% 
GREECE -  -  296  - 
UK 100  -  283  183% 
SPAIN 135 -  241  79% 
PORTUGAL  54 (1980)  116  188  248% (1980) 
ITALY 80  -  160  100% 
BELGIUM 122  137 155 27% 
GERMANY 70  -  142  103% 
NORWAY -  -  116 - 
DENMARK -  -  81  - 
NETHERLANDS 30  57  77  157% 
FRANCE 51  - 68  33% 
AUSTRIA -  - 51 - 
JAPAN -  -  18  - 
Source: Faure et. al. (1993), World Bank Legal and Judicial Reform Practice Group, Council of the Bars and Law 
Societies of the European Union, own calculations. 
 
 
TABLE 2 – NUMBER OF PRACTICING PHYSICIANS PER 100,000
COUNTRY 1980  1990  2000  %  1980-2000 
ITALY 263  470  599  128%   
SPAIN(*) 232  383  454  40% 
GREECE 245  339  438  (1999)  79% 
BELGIUM 231  327 385  67%   
GERMANY 222  301 359  62% 
PORTUGAL(*) 199  282  325  63% 
NETHERLANDS(*) 192  252  321  67%   
DENMARK 218  293  316  (1999)  45% 
AUSTRIA 164  224  309    88% 
FRANCE  194  262  300 (1999)  55% (1999) 
NORWAY  197  313  280 (1999)  42% (1999) 
US(*)  200  245  280 (1999)  40% (1999) 
SWITZERLAND 119  156  195  64% 
JAPAN(*) 130  170  190  46% 
UK 128  141  179  40% 
(*) Licensed Physicians 
Source: Faure et. al. (1993), WHO Regional Office for Europe Statistics, World Bank Health Indicators, OECD Health 
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TABLE 3– NUMBER OF PHYSICIANS PER 100,000 ENTERING THE WORKFORCE 
COUNTRY 1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  2000 
US -  -  -  5.9  -  5.6 
UK  - - - -  -  - 
ITALY  15.3  - - -  -  - 
GERMANY - -  -  15.4  14.8  - 
BELGIUM -  -  -  10.9  10.1  - 
NETHERLANDS -  -  -  9.1  9.9  - 
PORTUGAL - - -  4.1 -  - 
SPAIN  - - - -  -  - 
FRANCE -  8.5  -  -  - - 
AUSTRIA -  -  14.1  -  - - 
NORWAY  - - - -  -  - 
SWITZERLAND -  -  - 10.6  -  - 
GREECE  - - - -  -  - 
DENMARK - -  -  7.3  -  - 
JAPAN  - - - -  -  - 
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ENTRY  4.5  3.75 4.25 3.25  4  3.25 2.75 3.75  3  2.75  6 
FEES  4  3.42  2.42 3.5 3.75  3.75  1.58  3.75  2.25  2.75  4 
ORGAN.  1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5  2  1.5  1  1  3 
ADVERT.  2 1.16  1.67  1.5  1 1.16  1.34 1 1.34  1.16 2 
CONDUCT  5  4  4 4.5 2 2.5 3 2.5 2  2  6 


































































































































ENTRY  4  2  2.25 3.75  5  4.75 2.75 2.75 2.25  4  2.25  6 
FEES  3  2.3 1.7 1.7 2.2 1.9 1.9 0.9 1.5 0.4 1.7  3 
ORGAN.  3.5 4 3.5 4 2.5  2.5  2.5 2  2 3.5 1  4 
ADVERT.  1.67 1.5 1.34  1  0.67  0.67  1  1  0.5 0.33  0.33  2 
CONDUCT  5 4.5 5  3 3.5 3 3.5  4.5  3.5  1.5 3  6 





























































































TABLE 7 – COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: LAWYERS 
  NETH  US  BEL  E&W GER SPAIN POR FRA AUS NOR SAMPLE 










- -  -  -  -  5 










- -  -  -  -  5 






















































































































Notes: In brackets, the ranking position. 
IAS also includes Finland (1 and 1), Sweden (2 and 2), Denmark (3 and 3), Ireland (5 and 6), Italy (7 and 





TABLE 8 – COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: PHYSICIANS 
  US E&W  BEL  GER NETH SPAIN POR FRA AUS  NOR  SWI SAMPLE
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TABLE 9 



































































             
1  A law degree 
obtained from a 
recognized law 
school in the 
country is required 
for practice as an 
attorney? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  1/4  0 
 Registration  is 
required? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  1/4  0 
 License  is 
required? 
YES YES YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES  1/4  0 
 Membership  of 
professional body 
is required? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  0  1/4 
2  Additional training 



















 The  additional 
training ends with 
an examination? 
YES -- YES NO YES -- YES YES YES  YES  0  1/2 
3  The right (license) 
to practice as a 
lawyer is valid for 
the rest of one’s 
active life? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  1  0 
4  Are law schools 
very competitive 
with respect to 
attracting students 
and faculty by US 
standards?  
YES YES  NO YES YES NO NO NO NO  NO  1  0 
5  Do only attorneys 
have the right to 
plead before courts 
in your country? 
YES NO  NO NO YES YES YES NO NO YES  0  1/4 
  Does the right to 
plead depend on 
additional 
requirements? 
YES YES  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO  0  1/4 
 Do  attorneys  have 
the right to plead 
before any court in 
your country? 
NO NO NO YES YES YES YES NO YES  NO  1/4  0 
  Do only attorneys 
have the right to 
provide legal 
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advice? 
6  Are attorneys 
established in any 
EU member 
country allowed to 
provide legal 
advice in your 
country? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  1/4  0 
 Are  attorneys 
established in any 
EU member 
country allowed to 
plead before your 
courts? 
NO YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES  1/4  0 
  Are there any 
barriers to 
establishment? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  NO  0  1/4 




from other EU 
member countries?  
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  NO  0  1/4 
 STRUCTURE  OF 
LAW FIRMS 
              
7  Can attorneys enter 
into partnerships? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  1  0 




NO NO  YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO  1  0 
9  Can attorneys 
incorporate? 
YES YES YES NO YES NO NO YES NO  YES  1/2  0 




YES  YES  YES -- YES --  -- YES -- YES  0  1/2 
  PRICE/FEES                
10  Fees payable for 
legal service are 
freely negotiated? 
YES YES  NO YES YES YES YES YES NO  YES  1/3  0 
 The  government 
sets fees (min, 
max, or fixed, or 
recommended)?  
NO NO  YES NO NO NO NO NO YES  NO  0  1/3 
 The  self-regulatory 
organization of 
attorneys sets (min, 
max, or fixed, or 
recommended)? 
NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO YES  NO  0  1/3 
11  Fees can be based 
on hours worked? 
YES YES  NO YES YES YES YES YES NO  YES  1/4  0 
  Fees can be based 
on litigation value? 
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  Fees can be based 
on the complexity 
of the case? 
YES YES  NO YES YES YES YES YES NO  YES  1/4  0 
 Can  attorneys  use 
contingent fees? 
NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO  1/4  0 





YES YES  NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  1  0 
13  Are legal aid 




NO NO NO YES NO NO YES  NO NO NO  0  1 
  ADVERTISING               
14  Advertising is 
allowed subject to 
the same 
constraints as any 
other services? 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  0  1/3 
 The  state  restricts 
the advertising of 
attorneys relative 
to other services?  
NO  YES YES YES NO NO NO NO YES YES  1/3  0 
 The  self-regulatory 
body restricts the 
advertising of 
attorneys? 
YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES YES  YES  0  1/3 
15  Advertising is very 
limited (e.g., phone 
book and the name 
plate)? 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  0  1/6 
  Special expertise 
can be advertised? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  1/6  0 
  Fee level can be 
advertised? 
YES YES  NO NO YES NO YES NO NO  YES  1/6  0 
 Is  comparative 
advertising 
possible? 
NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO  1/6  0 
 Co-operation  with 
other attorneys can 
be advertised? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  1/6  0 
 Co-operation  with 
foreign attorneys or 
partners can be 
advertised? 





             
16  The state defines 
the codes of 
conduct? 
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 The  self-regulatory 
body defines the 
codes of conduct? 
YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES  0  1/2 
17  Is continuing 
education required 
as one of the items 
of the code of 
conduct? 
YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO YES YES  1  0 
18  Are lawyers 
required to keep 
records on all 
details of a case? 
YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES  NO  0  1/2 
 Must  the  records 
be supplied to the 
disciplinary body, 
when a complaint 
is filed? 
YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES  0  1/2 
19  Does the law 
require attorneys to 
give best advice? 
NO YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES  1/2  0 
  Does the self-
regulatory body 
require attorneys to 
give best advice? 
NO  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  1/2  0 
20  If the client of an 
attorney can prove 
that he did not 
obtain best advice 
and that as result 
he suffered a loss 





YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  1/2  0 
  Could the sanction 




NO  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  1/2  0 
21  Is liability for 
professional 
negligence usually 
applied by courts? 
YES YES  NO YES YES NO NO NO NO  YES  1/2  0 






YES  YES NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO  1/2  0 
Source: Faure et. al (1993), Paterson et. al (2003), Interview with the Chairman of the Portuguese Bar, José Miguel Júdice (Portugal), 
Estatuto General de la Abogacía Española (Spain), Reports from Bruno Deffains (France), Ehrling Eide (Norway), Michael Faure 




















































































  ENTRY 
REGULATIONS 
              
1  A medical degree 
from a recognized 
medical school in 
the country is 
required for 
practice as a 
doctor? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 1/4  0 
 Registration  is 
required? 
YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 1/4  0 
 License  is 
required? 
NO  YES YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES YES 1/4  0 
 Membership  of 
professional body 
is required? 
NO NO  YES YES NO YES YES YES YES  NO NO 0  1/4 
2  Additional training 












YES YES 0  1/2 
 The  additional 
training ends with 
an examination? 
NO YES  YES NO NO YES YES NO NO  NO YES 0  1/2 
3  The right (license) 
to practice as a 
doctor is valid for 
the rest of one’s 
active life? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  NO  NO 1  0 
4  Are medical 
schools very 
competitive with 
respect to attracting 
students and 
faculty by US 
standards? 
YES YES  NO YES YES NO NO YES NO  NO  YES 0  1 
5  Do most doctors 




NO  YES  NO NO NO YES NO YES NO NO NO 1/2  0 
  Do most doctors 
work for the 
national health 
system? 
YES NO YES YES YES NO YES NO NO YES  YES 0  1/2 
6  Are doctors 
established in 
private practice in 
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any EU member 
country allowed to 
provide medical 
services in your 
country? 
  Does the doctor 
have to establish 
himself in your 
country before he 
can practice 
medicine? 
NO  YES YES NO NO YES YES NO YES YES YES 0  1/4 
  Are there any 
barriers to 
establishment? 
YES  YES NO NO NO YES NO YES YES NO YES 0  1/4 
 Are  these 
requirements 
discriminating 
doctors from other 
EU member 
countries?  
YES  YES NO NO NO YES NO YES YES NO  NO 0  1/4 
  STRUCTURE OF 
DOCTOR’S 
FIRMS 
              
7  Can doctors enter 
into partnerships? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 1  0 




YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO YES YES YES 1  0 
9  Can doctors 
incorporate? 
YES YES  NO YES YES YES NO YES NO  YES YES 1/2  0 
 Do  any  further 
restrictions apply? 
NO  YES -- YES NO YES -- YES --  NO  YES 0  1/2 
10  Can doctors be 
employed by 
professional 
managers who are 
not doctors?  
YES YES  NO NO NO NO NO YES NO  YES YES 1  0 
 Only  by  recognized 
hospitals? 
--  -- YES YES NO YES YES -- YES --  --  0  1/2 
  PRICE/FEES                 
11  In private practice 
the dominant mode 
of payment for 
doctors is fee for 
service? 
YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES NO  YES YES 1/2  0 
 In  private  practice 
the dominant mode 
of payment for 
doctors is 
capitation fee?  
NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES  NO NO 0  1/2 
12  Is the fee freely 
negotiable between 
the doctor and the 
patient? 
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  Is there a minimum 
or maximum fee 
(or fee schedule)? 
NO NO  YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO  YES 0  1/5 
  Is there a fixed fee 
(or fee schedule) 
which is typically 
applied (say in 
more than 90% of 
the cases)? 
YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES YES NO YES 0  1/5 
 The  government 
sets fees (min, 
max, or fixed, or 
recommended)?  
YES NO YES NO NO YES YES YES YES  YES NO 0  1/5 
 The  doctors 
association or some 
other doctors’ 
organization sets 
the fees (min, max, 
or fixed, or 
recommended)? 
YES NO YES YES YES NO YES YES NO  NO YES 0  1/5 




higher fees in the 
private sector? 
YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 1/2  0 




higher fees in the 
public sector? 
NO  YES  NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 1/2  0 
  ADVERTISING                
14  Advertising is 
allowed subject to 
the same 
constraints as any 
other services? 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 0  1/3 
 The  state  restricts 
the advertising of 
doctors relative to 
other services?  
NO  YES  NO YES NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 1/3  0 
 The  self-regulatory 
body restricts the 
advertising of 
doctors? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 0  1/3 
15  Only the academic 
title and the special 
expertise can be 
advertised? 
NO NO  YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 0  1/6 
 Advertisements  in 
newspapers can be 
placed at any time? 
YES YES  NO NO NO YES NO NO NO  YES YES 1/6  0 
  Or only when a 
practice is opened? 
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 Advertising  is 
basically limited to 
the announcement 
of the opening and 
closing of a 
practice, the listing 
in the phone book 
and the nameplate? 
NO  NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES NO YES 0  1/6 
  Fee level can be 
advertised? 
NO  YES  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 1/6  0 
 Co-operation  with 
other doctors or 
specialists can be 
advertised? 
NO  YES YES NO NO YES NO NO YES YES YES 1/6  0 




              
16  The state defines 
the codes of 
conduct? 
NO YES  YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES  YES 1/2  0 
 The  self-regulatory 
body defines the 
codes of conduct? 
YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES NO 0  1/2 
17  Is continuing 
education required 
as one of the items 
of the code of 
conduct? 
NO  YES YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES YES 1  0 
18  Are doctors 
required to keep 
records on all 
details of a case? 
YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES NO  YES YES 0  1/2 
 Must  the  records 
be supplied to the 
disciplinary body , 
when a complaint 
is filed? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 0  1/2 
19  Does the law 
require doctors to 
give best advice 
and therapy? 
YES YES YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 1/2  0 
  Does the self-
regulatory body 
require doctors to 
give best advice 
and therapy? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 1/2  0 
20  If a patient can 
prove that he did 
not obtain best 
advice or therapy 
and that as result 
he suffered a loss 
(e.g. lost a case), 
can the self-
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regulatory body 
punish the doctor? 
  Could the sanction 




YES YES  NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 1/2  0 
21  Is liability for 
professional 
negligence usually 
applied by courts? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 1/2  0 






YES YES  NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 1/2  0 
Source: Faure et. al (1993), Estatuto do Médico, Regulamento sobre Publicidade and Código Deontológico (Portugal), Código de Ética 
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